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THOMAS'S SUPREME UNFITNESS-A LETTER
TO THE SENATE ON ADVISE AND
CONSENT
GaryJ. Simsont
October 15, 1992
Dear Senators:
When you voted 52-48 last October to put Clarence Thomas
on the Supreme Court, my initial reaction was one of surprise. I had
diligently watched the hearings on television (even when opposite
the baseball playoffs) and had practically devoured The New York
Times each day. But when the final vote was tallied, I felt much as I
did after the first time I saw "The Big Sleep." Surely at some point
the projectionist must have forgotten to show a reel!
Today marks a full year since your vote, and I believe I am now
able to view the vote with greater perspective. But not with greater
equanimity. The more I think about it, the more I am persuaded
that the process of appointing Supreme Court Justices is in need of
a basic overhaul. In writing to you today, I hope to convince you
that Thomas's appointment was so indefensible that the process
must be fundamentally flawed. I also hope to get you to think seriously about some rather substantial changes that I have in mind.
In the interest of full disclosure, I probably should mention
before going any further that Clarence Thomas and I were in the
same graduating class at Yale Law School. Having said that, however, I should add that we did not know one another at all well in
law school, we have had no contact since, and nothing that I have to
say about him in this letter is based on our very slight personal
acquaintance.
A brief note on organization is also probably in order at this
point. Although letters usually don't have footnotes, this one does.
Much as it would please me no end for you simply to accept as true
t

Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. B.A. 197 1,J.D. 1974, Yale University. I
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my rendition of particular cases, articles, testimony, etc., I expect
that some of you might like to have a look at a number of these
sources for yourselves. Rather than clutter the letter with these citations, I have put them in footnotes. I promise you, though, that I
will spare you the agony, regularly inflicted by law professors, of
having to keep jumping from text to textual footnote and back to
text in order to understand fully the author's point. Everything I
have to say is in the text. There are no textual footnotes to be
found.
CLARENCE THOMAS, SUPREME COURT NOMINEE

I find your vote to confirm Clarence Thomas so clear a signal
that something is fundamentally wrong because, on the merits, he
did not present a close case. Very simply, I have no doubt that if
each of you had voted based on your considered judgments of
whether appointing Thomas was in the nation's best interests, you
would have overwhelmingly voted "no."
To try to prove my point I would like to analyze the Thomas
nomination for you in terms of an approach to Senate confirmation
of Supreme Court nominees that I suggested not long ago in a law
review article.' I argued in the article that Senators seeking to vote
on Supreme Court nominees in a way consistent with the nation's
best interests should give special attention to the significance that a
nominee's appointment is likely to have with respect to three subjects: the outcome of cases of major national importance; public
confidence in the Supreme Court; and the fairness and efficiency of
the Supreme Court's decisionmaking process. These three subjects
are especially relevant to confirmation decisions because they are
inherently matters of substantial national importance and because
appointments are apt to have great significance for them.
1. Case outcomes.-I believe that at the conclusion of the hearings any of you who thought seriously about the available evidence

could have said a fair amount about how Thomas would be apt to
vote if given a seat on the Supreme Court. Although his "paper
trail" was not as wide-ranging as Robert Bork's, it was frequently as
revealing.
Consider, for example, Thomas's remark in a speech that Lewis

2
Lehrman's article, The Declarationof Independence and the Right to Life,

I GaryJ. Simson, Taking the Court Seriously: A ProposedApproach to Senate Confirmation
of Supreme Court Nominees, 7 CONST. COMM. 283 (1990).
2 Lewis E. Lehrman, The Declarationof Independence and the Right to Life, AM. SPECTATOR, Apr. 1987, at 21.
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was "a splendid example of applying natural law." 3 Despite its brevity, this remark was about as probative a piece of evidence of a likely
vote to overrule Roe v. Wade4 as you could ever hope to find. In case
some of you never bothered to look at the Lehrman article, let me
assure you that it makes, with a remarkable lack of subtlety, the
point that abortion is murder and fundamentally at odds with the
basic principles on which our nation and Constitution are premised.
No one who read more than a sentence or two of its three magazine
pages could fail to get the message, and Thomas's singling it out for
praise certainly implies that he read substantially more than that.
Furthermore, anyone who for some reason felt the need for additional evidence that Thomas would vote to overrule Roe had it at
hand in the report produced by Thomas and the other members of
the Meese-appointed White House Working Group on the Family. 5
In the course of identifying various "fatally flawed" acts of "judicial
activism" that in recent decades have "eroded [the family's] special
status considerably," the authors of the report listed (in impeccable
right-to-life jargon) the Court's decisions invalidating "State attempts to protect the life of children in utero [Roe], to protect paternal interest in the life of the child before birth [Planned Parenthoodv.
Danforth], and to respect parental authority over minor children in
abortion decisions [Danforth]." 6 Need I go on? With Thomas's vote
to overrule Roe already having become a reality in his very first year
on the Court, 7 anyone who believes that the evidence I have cited
was not extremely telling has a lot of explaining to do.
Not surprisingly, evidence that Thomas would vote to invalidate affirmative action measures at every opportunity existed in
abundance. After all, opposition to affirmative action had long been
Thomas's calling card-the stance that endeared him, as a black, to
conservative Republicans and earned him a berth on the Reagan
team.8 A chapter that he contributed to a book looking back on the
Reagan era was especially revealing. In the chapter Thomas attributed the "failure of the Supreme Court to deal adequately with racerelated issues" to a misguided preoccupation with group, rather
3
Clarence Thomas, Why Black Americans Should Look to Conservative Policies,
Speech to the Heritage Foundation (June 18, 1987).
4 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
5
WHrrE HOUSE WORKING GROUP ON THE FAMILY, THE FAMILY: PRESERVING
AMERICA'S FUTURE (1986).
6
Id. at 10-12. (The cases indicated in brackets-Roe and Planned Parenthood v.

Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976)-are cited in footnotes to the quoted material.)
7
See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2855, 2873 (1992) (indicating
Thomas's concurrence in two opinions that call for overruling Roe).
8
See Neil A. Lewis, From Poverty to U.S. Bench, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1991, at Al.
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than individual, rights. 9 Zeroing in on specific instances of Supreme
Court malfeasance, Thomas minced no words in expressing his contempt for various Court decisions upholding race-based or genderbased group preferences. According to Thomas, United Steelworkers
v. Weber 10 was an "egregious example" of the Court's willingness in
these cases to engage in "rather creative interpretations of equal
protection and legislative intent,"' I and Fullilove v. Klutznick 12 established that the constitutional guarantee of equal protection is "irrelevant" as a check on even "crude" group preferences enacted by
Congress. 13
Although the Court's docket during Thomas's first year did not
provide him with an opportunity to demonstrate his predictability
on affirmative action questions, a case left over from his days on the
D.C. Circuit did. In a long-delayed opinion-some would say conveniently long-delayedl4-for a divided three-judge panel, Thomas
struck down in Lamprecht v. FCC15 an FCC comparative licensing
preference for women. He held that the preference failed to satisfy
the standard that the Supreme Court had adopted in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC16 for determining the constitutionality of
congressionally mandated preferences for racial minorities. This
"middle-tier" standard, which the Court had applied for a number
of years to all gender-based laws, 17 was designed to be substantially
easier to meet than the "strict scrutiny" standard that the Court applied to all laws disadvantaging racial minorities' 8 and to any statemandated minority preferences. 19 For Thomas to invalidate the
program in Lamprecht under the Metro Broadcastingstandard was no
mean feat. After all, the Court in Metro Broadcastinghad upheld an
FCC minority preference program identical in operation to the gender preference program here, and it had emphasized the impor9 Clarence Thomas, Civil Rights as a Principle Versus Civil Rights as an Interest, in AsSESSING THE REAGAN YEARS 391, 392 (David Boaz ed., 1988).
10
443 U.S. 193 (1979).
11 Thomas, supra note 9, at 395.
12 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
13 Thomas, supra note 9, at 396.
14 See Garry Sturgess, Thomas Strikes FCC Preferencesfor Women in Unreleased Ruling,
THE RECORDER, Sept. 26, 1991, at 1 (reporting that "sources at the D.C. Circuit" have
revealed that, prior to his nomination to the Supreme Court, Thomas had "written and
circulated" an opinion for the court in Lamprecht v. FCC; the "long delay has raised concerns both inside and outside the courthouse that Thomas may have withheld the opinion because of its potential political impact on his confirmation").
15 958 F.2d 382 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
16 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
17 See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
18 See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497
(1954).
19 See Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
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tance of deference to Congress in the course of doing so. Thomas's
application of Metro Broadcastingreaffirmed what his prenomination
record gave you no reason to doubt: that as a Justice he would
prove to be an unwavering opponent of affirmative action. Free as a
Justice to vote to abandon the Metro Broadcasting standard that he
applied so grudgingly as a court of appeals judge in Lamprecht, there
could be no real question whether he would vote to abandon it and
call for adoption of the nearly insuperable strict scrutiny standard in
its stead.
The book chapter mentioned above was also one of various indicators that Thomas would be a staunch defender of presidential
power in his votes on the Court. In the chapter Thomas praised
Oliver North's testimony before the Iran-contra committee as proof
that it is still possible to defend "limited government. ' 20 The committee, according to Thomas, "beat an ignominious retreat before
21
North's direct attack on it and, by extension, on all of Congress.
Some of you may be wondering how Oliver North was defending
"limited government" by claiming a right-indeed, a duty-to pursue presidential policies without regard to limitations imposed by
Congress or the Constitution itself. The key is to understand that
when Thomas says "limited government" he thinks "limited congressional interference with presidential government." His ideal of "limited
government" is hands off the commander-in-chief.
Thomas's strong criticism of the Supreme Court's decision upholding the special prosecutor statute 22 also gave you good cause to
expect that he would be a solid vote on the Court for expansive
presidential authority. One might have thought that the presence
on the other side of Chief Justice Rehnquist-certainly no President-basher 23 -would have caused Thomas to ask himself whether
allowing for court-appointed counsel to investigate possible executive branch lawlessness was really so serious an encroachment on
executive authority after all. But if Rehnquist's vote and authorship
of the majority opinion produced any such doubts, Thomas did not
let on. Instead, he charged that "conservative heroes such as the
ChiefJustice failed not only conservatives but all Americans." 24 In a
similar vein, recall Thomas's comment, almost Nixon-like in tenor,
that the "numerous congressional investigations in recent years...
20

Thomas, supra note 9, at 399.
Id.
22 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
23
See, e.g., Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 545 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
24 Clarence Thomas, How to Talk About Civil Rights: Keep It Principled and Positive, Keynote Address to the Pacific Research Institute (Aug. 4, 1988).
21
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seem little more than attempts to embarrass the White House."'25
Circle the wagons! The President is under siege!
You may have noticed that, in discussing Thomas's likely votes
on abortion, affirmative action, and presidential power, I made no
mention of his testimony on these issues at his confirmation hearings. I want to assure you that this was no accident. For purposes of
predicting Thomas's likely votes on the Court, I don't think his testimony warrants serious consideration.
As you recall, Thomas spent several days explaining to the Senate Judiciary Committee why his prenomination writings and
speeches were far less indicative of his likely votes on the Court than
a number of his interrogators on the Committee seemed to believe.
His explanations took a variety of forms-in particular, those words
don't mean what you think they mean, I cited (or signed) that but I
didn't really read it, I said that just to please my audience, and I said
that before I became a judge. Yet, however varied in form, the explanations were remarkably consistent in one respect: their unpersuasiveness. Several of you on the Committee expressed to the
nominee your disbelief and exasperation with his explanations. 2 6
You did so in what seemed to me exceptionally respectful and polite
terms. I can appreciate your restraint under the circumstances, but
in retrospect I wonder whether the nomination might have collapsed of its own weight if you had greeted some of these explanations with the peals of laughter they deserved.
Later in this letter I will discuss a number of these explanations
in the course of analyzing the likely significance of Thomas's appointment for public confidence in the Court and for the Court's
decisionmaking process. For now, however, I would like to comment briefly on what seems to me Thomas's most far-reaching, most
all-purpose type of explanation-"I said that before I became a
judge." According to Thomas, becoming a judge is "an amazing
process. You want to be stripped down like a runner." 2 7 Furthermore, after his appointment to the federal bench in 1990, he strived
so successfully to "shed the baggage of ideology" that old friends
came to regard him as a "worthless conversationalist." 28 Thus, to
use the statements of Clarence Thomas, executive branch official, to
try to predict how Clarence Thomas, judge, is apt to vote on the
25 Clarence Thomas, The HigherLaw Background of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, 12 HARV.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 63, 69 n.33 (1989).
26 See, e.g., Neil A. Lewis, Thomas Undergoes Tough Questioning on Past Remarks, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 12, 1991, at Al.
27
Linda Greenhouse, In Trying to Clarify What He Is Not, Thomas Opens Question of
What He Is, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1991, at A19 (quoting Thomas's testimony).
28 Id. (quoting Thomas's testimony).
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Supreme Court would be not only unfair but contrary to common
sense.
It seems unnecessary for me to take the time now to refute
Thomas's notion that people are supposed to cast aside their ideological leanings when they become judges and essentially transform
themselves into blank slates. Frankly, the idea is so silly, so contrary
to the lessons of history29 and human nature, that I doubt that it
requires serious rebuttal. In any event, it seems enough for now to
focus on the credibility of Thomas's claim of personal transformation. Here is a man who spent the bulk of his career stridently, often
sneeringly, arguing for interpretations of the Constitution and federal statutes that would warm the hearts of conservative Republicans. Here is someone whose ideological self-righteousness and
rigidity earned him the Quayle-like role of Administration ambassador to the party's right wing. Yet, we are somehow to believe not
simply that after many years as a judge this man may relinquish
some of his ideological "baggage"-no small leap of faith in
Thomas's case-but that after scarcely more than a year on the
bench his transformation to a paragon of impartiality is virtually
complete. Please!
Abortion, affirmative action, and presidential power were not
the only important issues for which you had enough evidence to
make a rather confident prediction about Thomas's likely votes. At
this point, though, I don't think there would be much value in continuing to review such evidence with you. In fact, given the fairly
modest nature (at least in my view) of the conclusion that I am going
to offer about how much Thomas's likely votes should have turned
you against him, I think any more discussion here of likely votes
would be overkill, more of a distraction than a help. Instead, I am
hoping that, based on the above discussion of likely votes and your
own knowledge of Thomas's speeches and writings, you will agree
with me on the following point: that, at the time of the confirmation
vote, you should have expected that Thomas would vote in cases of
major national importance in a way that rarely would disappoint the
most orthodox of Reagan Republicans.
If we can agree on this point, the question becomes: how
should this expectation have affected your vote? I think the answer
rather obviously depends upon your individual ideologies. For the
Reagan-style conservatives among you, Thomas's likely votes
should have been cause for dancing in the streets. As far as likely
votes, he was everything you were denied when your colleagues re29

See

HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF AP-

POINTMENTS TO THE SUPREME COURT

(3d ed. 1992).
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jected Robert Bork, plus he promised, at 43 years of age, to give you
Bork-like votes for many more years than Bork was apt to serve.
For those of you ideologically most at home in the center,
Thomas's likely votes should have been a strong, though probably
not conclusive, reason for voting against him. There was a substantial difference between Thomas's likely votes and the votes that you
believe would be in the nation's best interests. In addition,
Thomas's vote might well be decisive in the near future in overturning at least two major precedents that you think should stand-Roe
and Metro Broadcasting-andhis vote would generally shift farther to
the right the balance of a Court already not as close to the center as
you would like. Furthermore, it was reasonable to expect Bush to
nominate someone whose likely votes would come quite a bit closer
to the ones you would like to see. In nominating Thomas, Bush had
made no discernible effort to meet the Senate ideologically half-way.
Altogether, you should have been sufficiently unhappy with
Thomas's likely votes to vote against him unless you found him extremely promising in other respects.
The liberals among you should not have been unhappy with
Thomas's likely votes; you should have been inconsolable. Having
surveyed his likely votes, you should have made up your mind that
this guy had to go. The gap between his likely votes and the ones
you feel would be in the nation's best interests was more like a
chasm. Also, his vote threatened to create a Court majority to overrule major precedents such as Roe and Metro Broadcastingthat seem
to you the minimum the Court should be doing to protect individual
rights. In your view, Roe should not simply be allowed to stand, but
rather should be restored to what it was before the Court began
chipping away at it;3° and the Metro Broadcastingstandard should be
extended to apply to all government-mandated affirmative action
programs, state and federal alike. Thomas's vote would add rightward momentum to a Court that already seems to you far too conservative for the nation's good. When Justice O'Connor was
nominated, Congressman Udall commented: "My Democratic
friends ought to be grateful.... It's almost inconceivable to me that
they could do any better. Ronald Reagan isn't going to appoint liberal Democrats." 3' You couldn't expect George Bush to appoint
liberal Democrats either. But Clarence Thomas is no Sandra Day
O'Connor. Gone is any real promise of moderation. For you to accept her was realism; for you to accept him would be capitulation.
30
See, e.g., Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989); Maher v.
Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Gary J. Simson, Abortion, Poverty, and the EqualProtection of the
Laws, 13 GA. L. REV. 505 (1979).
31 Morris K. Udall, A Master Stroke, WASH. POST, July 13, 1981, at A13.
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This time you could do better, and you should have been sufficiently
irate over Thomas's likely votes and Bush's uncompromising approach to demand better by voting no.
The ideological spectrum that the hundred of you represent obviously has more shades than I have described. Even those among
you who regard yourselves as members of the groups named may
not share all the beliefs that I ascribe to your group. I don't think,
though, that any of you should have great difficulty locating yourself
on the spectrum relative to the three positions I have described and
then deciding, based on the position or positions to which you are
closest, how you should have responded to Thomas's likely votes.
What does all this mean for Thomas's chances for confirmation? Based on my impression of the ideological spread among you,
I think it means that a substantial majority of you should have considered his likely votes a strong or conclusive reason for voting
against him. That may sound pretty bleak, but it's almost sunny
compared to what else I have to say about how you should have
viewed his possible appointment to the Court.
2. Public confidence in the Court.-Publicconfidence is a precious
commodity for all government institutions, but especially for the
Supreme Court. Unlike the President and members of Congress,
the Justices can't point to their election as a source of legitimacy for
their decisions. Also, lacking the enforcement mechanisms of the
President and Congress, the Court is particularly dependent on
32
public respect for its effectiveness.
As the hearings came to a close, I believe that each of you, regardless of ideology, should have had sufficient doubt about
Thomas's personal integrity, objectivity, openmindedness, and dedication to conclude that his appointment was not viable because of
its implications for public confidence in the Court. An explanation
of why you should have doubted Thomas's objectivity, openmindedness, and dedication can wait until I discuss the implications of his
appointment for the Court's decisionmaking process. For now it
seems sufficient to examine his personal integrity. Public confidence in the Court depends greatly, perhaps more than anything
else, on a sense that the Justices are individuals of the highest personal integrity. I think you should have had such serious doubts
about Thomas's personal integrity that you should have been able
to resolve to reject him based on these doubts alone.
To begin with, his chairmanship of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission had to fuel some such doubts. During his
32 See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 503-04 (Alexander Hamilton) (Mod. Lib. ed.
1937); Felix Frankfurter, The Supreme Court in the Mirroroffustices, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 781,
796 (1957).
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years as chairman, the Commission allowed the statute of limitations
to run on thousands of complaints under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act. Thomas later described this agency inaction as
"embarrassing and inexcusable," but maintained that it reflected
"bad management" at the district level rather than high-level indifference.3 3 Many others were not so charitable. 34 Also very troubling were various well-documented charges by highly reputable
sources to the effect that the Commission under Thomas's leadership had been indefensibly lax in enforcing the laws protecting women and minorities from employment discrimination. 3 5 How close
is the connection between charges of agency irresponsibility and its
chairman's personal integrity? Very close, as Thomas himself conceded in testimony before the Senate Special Committee on Aging:
"To suggest that we are derelict in our duties is an ad hominem
36
attack that impugns my integrity and the agency's."
Also raising doubts about Thomas's integrity was the inconsistency between his strident public opposition to race-based preferences and his willingness to accept such preferences for himself.
Did he really believe that his appointments as Assistant Secretary for
Civil Rights in the Department of Education in 1981 and as Chairman of the EEOC in 1982 were made without regard to the fact of
his race? Was he really persuaded that he was selected because he
was seen as the best person for the job-or at least the best conservative for the job-and that his being black did not provide an
important boost? Particularly in light of the fact that he had no significant background in civil rights work before these appointments
to high posts specializing in civil rights, 3 7 it is hard to imagine that
the answers to these questions are yes. Even assuming, though, that
they are, is there even the minutest possibility that he believed that
his nomination to the Supreme Court was color-blind? If so, I think
33

See Robert Pear, Court Nominee Defied Labels As Head ofJob-Rights Panel, N.Y. TIMES,

July 16, 1991, at Al (quoting Thomas).
34 See, e.g., Nomination of Clarence Thomas to Be a Judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. 119-21 (1990) (testimony of Dr. Daniel Thursz, President, The National
Council on the Aging, Inc.); SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 102D CONG., IST SESS.,
REPORT ON THE NOMINATION OF CLARENCE THOMAS TO BE AN ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, TOGETHER WITH ADDITIONAL AND SUPPLEMENTAL VIEWS

80-82 (Comm. Print 1991) [hereinafter
Sen. Metzenbaum).
35

See, e.g., NAACP, A

SENATE JUDICIARY COMM.]

(additional views of

REPORT ON THE NOMINATION OF JUDGE CLARENCE THOMAS AS

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, ENDANGERED

6-7, 31-47 (1991);

WOMEN'S

LIBERTIES: WHAT JUDGE CLARENCE THOMAS' REC-

12-48 (1991).
36 EEOC Officials Defend Agency's Enforcement of Age Bias Act, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA)
No. 175, at A-8, A-9 (Sept. 11, 1987).
37 See Lewis, supra note 8.
ORD PORTENDS FOR WOMEN 1-2,
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it's fair to say that he may be the only person around who took President Bush seriously when Bush made that claim.3 8 When asked at
the time of his nomination how he would respond to people who
would say he was chosen only because of his race, this long-time
preacher of the evils for blacks of preferential treatment3 9 put everything in proper perspective when he replied: "I think a lot worse
things have been said. I disagree with that, but I'll have to live with
it."40

Though hardly insubstantial, the doubts about Thomas's integrity generated by his record at the EEOC and his acceptance for
himself of race-based preferences seem modest compared to those
generated by his testimony in the first set of hearings-the set that
concluded before Anita Hill's charges became public. In the past,
nominees sometimes have responded to the Senate Judiciary Committee's questions in ways that seemed less than entirely honest. To
the best of my knowledge, though, none of them could hold a candle to Clarence Thomas as far as showing obvious contempt for the
truth. Time and again he responded to questions in ways that all
but dared some of you on the Committee to call him a liar-something he knew was not apt to happen. A number of his supporters
on and off the Committee already had made clear that they stood
ready to shout "racist" at anyone treating Thomas less cordially
than the Committee had treated nominee David Souter the year
before. 4 ' I see no need to discuss all of the many statements by
Thomas in the first set of hearings that undermined his claim to personal integrity. I think a discussion of several will suffice to show
how drastically his testimony in those hearings undercut this claim.
Among the most outrageous of Thomas's statements were
those that denied the common-sense meaning of particular excerpts
from his speeches and writings. Real standouts in this regard were
his responses to questions quoting excerpts in which he was obviously endorsing the use of natural law in constitutional interpretation. Thomas undoubtedly recognized that if he admitted that he
had endorsed natural law (often referred to as "higher law") as a
basis for interpreting the Constitution, he would give his opponents
38
Excerpts From News ConferenceAnnouncing Court Nominee, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1991, at
A14.
39 See, e.g., Clarence Thomas, Climb the Jagged Mountain (excerpts from commencement speech given at Savannah State College, June 9, 1985), N.Y. TIMES, July 17,
1991, at A21; Thomas, supra note 3.
40 Maureen Dowd, Conservative Black Judge, Clarence Thomas, Is Named to Marshall's
Court Seat, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1991, at Al, A15.
41 See Linda Greenhouse, Sticking to the Script, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 1991, at A21;
Neil A. Lewis, Thomas to Win High Court Seat, Senators Predict, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 1991,
at 1.
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ammunition to argue that he was a serious threat to make unprincipled use of the Constitution in behalf of conservative political ends.
Natural law is a sufficiently ill-defined and amorphous concept that
they could credibly argue that Thomas would use it as a cover to
read his personal value preferences into the Constitution. 4 2 Confronted with his past endorsements of natural law in constitutional
interpretation, Thomas of course might have tried to explain why he
believed natural law could be applied in a principled way. Or perhaps he might have tried to convince you that he had changed his
mind and no longer believed that natural law should have a place in
constitutional interpretation. Neither of these tactics might have
proved particularly persuasive. Neither of them, however, would
have been nearly as demeaning to Thomas or as insulting to your
intelligence as the one he took: denying that his statements endorsing natural law in constitutional interpretation did anything of the
sort.
A series of exchanges between Thomas and Committee Chair
Biden illustrates the tactic well. Biden first read aloud to Thomas
the following statement that Thomas had made about the writings
of Stephen Mesito, a leading advocate of natural law interpretations
of the Constitution that would give expanded protection to property
rights: "I find attractive the arguments of scholars such as Stephen
Mesito who defend an activist Supreme Court that would strike
down laws restricting property rights."' 43 Biden then asked Thomas
to explain what he found attractive about Mesito's arguments, and
Thomas responded:
My interest in the whole area was as a political philosophy ....

I

don't believe that in my writings I have indicated that we should
have an activist Supreme Court or that we should have any form
of activism on the Supreme Court.... I found his [Mesito's] arguments interesting, and I was not talking particularly of natural law,
44
Mr. Chairman, in the context of adjudication.
When Biden then pointed out that in the quoted statement Thomas
had claimed to find Mesito's arguments "attractive," rather than
simply "interesting," and that Thomas had explained their attractiveness in terms of adjudication ("striking down laws"), rather than
intellectual stimulation, Thomas didn't budge. He responded as if
42

See Laurence H. Tribe, 'NaturalLaw'and the Nominee, N.Y. TIMES,July 15, 1991, at

A15; David Margolick, Sizing Up the Talk of 'NaturalLaw' Many IdeologiesDiscover a Precept,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 1991, at A22. See generally John Hart Ely, The Supreme Court, 1977
Term-Foreword: On Discovering Fundamental Values, 92 HARV. L. REV. 5, 22-32 (1978).
43 Excerpts From Senate's Hearings [of Sept. 10, 1991] on the Thomas Nomination, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 11, 1991, at A22.
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repetition might somehow magically transform his statement about
Mesito into something it plainly was not:
I don't see a role for the use of natural law in constitutional adjudication. My interest in exploring natural law and natural rights
was purely in the context of political theory. I was interested in
that. There were debates that I had with individuals, and I pursued that on a part-time basis. I was an agency chairman. 4 5
Instead of pressing Thomas further about this one prior statement, Biden tried to get him to concede that he had endorsed the
use of natural law in constitutional interpretation by showing him
that the evidence that he had done so was too abundant to deny.
Biden read aloud other prior statements by Thomas on natural law,
concluding with one that Biden probably thought so unambiguous
in its endorsement of natural law in constitutional interpretation
that Thomas would have no choice but to yield: "The higher law
background of the American Government, whether explicitly appealed to or not, provides the only firm basis for a just and wise
constitutional decision."'4 6 But if this was Biden's thinking, Thomas
soon showed how badly Biden had underestimated the depths to
which Thomas was willing to sink in his quest for a seat on the
Court. When asked to reconcile these excerpts with his current
claim that he had never advocated using natural law in constitutional interpretation, Thomas continued to deny the undeniable:
I was interested in the political theory standpoint. I was not interested in constitutional adjudication. I was not at the time adjudi47
cating cases.
Apparently nothing was too obvious to deny if it seemed advantageous to do so. (These denials were so demonstrative of a lack of
integrity that I confess some difficulty understanding how Thomas
could have perceived them as advantageous. The answer seems to
be that they were part of an overall strategy of limiting at all costs
the scope of substantive debate. According to a news report,
Thomas's White House-donated handlers "believed that the nominee could only harm his chances by engaging in any open-ended
debate or discussion with committee members over issues." 4 8 Quite
a vote of confidence in Thomas's legal prowess! But more about
that later.)
Probably no one statement in the first set of hearings undermined Thomas's general credibility as much as his assertion that he
45
46

Id.
Id.

47
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Id.
Lewis, supra note 41, at 7.
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had never discussed the merits of Roe v. Wade with anyone. 49 The
assertion was so obviously at odds with so many realities-Roe's controversiality among the public, Thomas's words of praise in a speech
for Lehrman's strongly antiabortion article,5 0 the important place in
Thomas's upbringing of a religion firmly opposed to abortion,
etc.-that it could not help but provoke widespread hilarity,5 ' and I
don't think I need to take the time to comment further on it here.
Though not as eye-catching as his claim that he had never seriously discussed Roe, Thomas's attempt to explain away his praise for
the Lehrman article as simply a means to please his audience may be
equally as damning. When asked by Senator Biden to explain what
he meant when he told an audience that Lehrman's article was "a
splendid example of applying natural law," Thomas responded:
What I was attempting to do in the beginning of that speech was
to make clear to a conservative audience that blacks who were
Republicans and the issues that affected blacks were being addressed and being dealt with by conservatives in what I considered a less-than-acceptable manner.... I was speaking in the Lou
Lehrman Auditorium of the Heritage Foundation. I thought that
if I demonstrated that one of their own accepted at least the concept of natural rights, that they would be more apt to accept that
concept as an underlying principle for being more aggressive on
52
civil rights. My whole interest was civil rights enforcement.
This explanation is so damning not because it is unpersuasive-in
fact, it is unpersuasive, but no more so than various other explanations he offered-but because it reveals how impoverished a sense
he has of what constitutes ethical behavior. Although Thomas offered this explanation with no apparent misgivings, it was far from
neutral. You don't need a Ph.D. in ethics to know that it is wrong to
tell people things that you don't believe, but that they would like to
hear, in order to get them to do things you want. Yet, this is precisely what Thomas blithely claimed he had done in his speech
before the Heritage Foundation. If any of you had any question as
to whether his responses in the hearings conformed more closely to
what he really believed or to what he felt would be most likely to get
a majority of you to vote for him, this endorsement of opportunism
should have answered it.
49 SENATEJUDICIARY COMM., supra note 34, at 108-09 (quoting Thomas's testimony
of Sept. 11, 1991); Lewis, supra note 26, at A21 (reporting Thomas's testimony of Sept.
11, 1991).
50 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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Up to this point I have avoided saying anything about the second set of hearings-those devoted to Anita Hill's allegations. I
have done so because I believe that what those hearings have to tell
us about Thomas's integrity can't be fully appreciated until the lessons of the first set of hearings are understood. To put the matter
more bluntly, a big reason for thinking Thomas was not telling the
truth in the second set of hearings was that he had made such a
habit of not doing so in the first set.
The second set of hearings was so riveting partly because it
presented diametrically opposed accounts. This was plainly not a
case of mixed signals, where one person said something that he intended to mean one thing and the other person interpreted it to
mean something else. Hill claimed Thomas made various offensive,
graphic statements, and Thomas denied that he had ever said anything to her remotely of the sort. Both could not be telling the
truth, and since Hill claimed that Thomas made all the alleged statements to her when no one could overhear, deciding which of the
two was being truthful meant deciding who was the more credible
witness.
I am not going to take you through the second set of hearings
point by point in order to prove to you that the more credible witness was Anita Hill. Frankly, I don't think the matter was even arguably a close call.
On the one hand, you had Anita Hill, someone not known to
you before these hearings but a person whose past (as presented in
the hearings) inspired confidence in her credibility and whose performance in the hearings-patient, dignified, and thoughtful, by any
measure-did so as well. Although some Thomas supporters on
and off the Committee suggested possible motives she might have
had for fabricating charges against Thomas, all of these suggestions
were pure speculation. 5 3 The fact that she had communicated years
before to friends the substance of the allegations ultimately made to
the Committee gave credence to her account. By the same token,
despite what some Thomas supporters would have had you believe,
none of her actions during or since her years working for Thomas
detracted from the credibility of the account. Some that may seem
puzzling, such as following Thomas to the EEOC and continuing to
have some contact with him after leaving the EEOC, become much
more understandable if you are willing to recognize that not only
men but women as well often take risks and make personal sacrifices
for the sake of a career. Others, such as taking years to make public
53
See Maureen Dowd, With Each Round of Testimony, The Mood at the Hearing Sways,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1991, at Al; Andrew Rosenthal, White House Role in Thomas Defense,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1991, at Al.
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her allegations, are much easier to understand if you listen to what
experts on sexual harassment have to say. In fact, if the Committee
had allowed such experts to testify, it would have been obvious to
everyone that, far from being atypical for a victim of sexual harassment, Anita Hill's behavior during her years with Thomas and after
54
was so typical as to be virtually a textbook case.
On the other hand, you had Clarence Thomas, appearing
before you fresh off of a performance in the first set of hearings that
left his credibility in tatters. Having so recently heard him make one
disingenuous statement after another and endorse opportunism in
speaking to others, you had every reason to question whether he
would tell you the truth about Hill's charges if doing so would be to
his disadvantage; and there couldn't be the slightest doubt that if
the truth was what Hill claimed, it would be to Thomas's enormous
disadvantage to admit it. But, you had to ask yourselves, was
Thomas really so lacking in integrity that he could (1) while serving
in a civil rights capacity in the Department of Education and as the
nation's top employment discrimination official at the EEOC, act toward an employee in the offensive and degrading ways described by
Hill, and then (2) stand before a Senate committee and a national
television audience and perjure himself by denying it? If his testimony in the first set of hearings and other prior behavior left any
doubt in your mind that the answer was yes, his testimony in the
second set of hearings surely should have dispelled it.
Some testimony shamelessly appealed for sympathy, such as his
revelation that his mother was "confined to her bed, unable to work,
and unable to stop crying" 5 5 and his various other attempts to portray himself and his family as persons all but destroyed by opponents and a confirmation process unfair and heartless from the
moment of his nomination. 56 Other testimony-in particular, his
use of a racial lynching metaphor to describe his situation-appealed to emotion in ways far worse.
According to Thomas, the second set of hearings was a "high58
tech lynching," 5 7 and he was not going to "provide the rope."
54 See Louise F. Fitzgerald, Science v. Myth: The Failure of Reason in the Clarence Thomas
Hearings, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1399 (1992). See generally BARBARA A. GuTEx, SEX AND THE
WORKPLACE (1985); U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN
THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE: IS IT A PROBLEM? (1981); U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION
BOARD, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: AN UPDATE (1988).

55 Judge Clarence Thomas: 'My Name Has Been Harmed', N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1991, at
10 (text of Thomas's opening statement at hearings of Oct. 11, 1991).
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The racial lynching metaphor was wildly inapt. Black men were not
lynched for anything they allegedly did to women who, like Anita
Hill, were black.5 9 In fact, although Thomas seemed intent on making everyone forget that Anita Hill is black, the truth is that the
group to which Hill belongs-black women-has hardly been privileged historically by comparison with black men, having had to experience invidious discrimination on the basis not only of race but
of gender as well. 60 Furthermore, it is difficult to imagine a group of
people bearing less resemblance to those who lynched blacks than
the group accused by Thomas of a lynching mentality. This group,
which appeared to include not only the seven members of the Committee who were already on record against his nomination but also
others in active opposition to the nomination,- was largely made up
of people, white and black, who for years had been at the forefront
of the battle for racial justice.
The racial lynching metaphor was also terribly inflammatory.
As Thomas was well aware, nothing was so likely to turn the entire
proceedings into a free-for-all and divert the search for truth as a
charge of racism. For any nominee to make so reckless and irresponsible a charge would be strong evidence of lack of integrity.
For Clarence Thomas to make this charge was even more damning
than that. Having spent years sternly telling blacks that they must
pull themselves up by their bootstraps and stop claiming racism as
an excuse for their failures, 6 ' Thomas was all too quick to charge
racism when the claim came in handy for him.
Am I saying that it is absolutely certain that Thomas did what
Hill claimed? Of course not, but absolute certainty is not the issue.
Relative likelihood is. Particularly in light of Thomas's official responsibilities at the time Hill was working for him, the allegations, if
true, were very damning as far as Thomas's integrity. Although it
was not entirely clear at the time that the sort of verbal harassment
alleged was unlawful under federal employment discrimination
law-it, of course, has since become dear 62 -there could not have
been any question whether Hill might feel extremely humiliated and
degraded by such behavior. In addition, if the allegations were true,
then Thomas had clearly perjured himself throughout the second
set of hearings and, in so doing, had further demonstrated grave
59
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65 S. CAL. L. REv. 1361, 1362-63 (1992).
60 See Kimberle Crenshaw, Race, Gender, and Sexual Harassment, 65 S. CAL. L. REv.
1467 (1992); Freedman, supra note 59.
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lack of integrity. Under the circumstances, even if there were no
more than, say, a 40% chance that Hill's allegations were true, I
believe you should have regarded them as a serious strike against
Thomas. But the odds that Hill's allegations were true were much
higher than 40%-so much higher in my view that I believe you
should have concluded that the allegations were enough to disqualify him for the job.
Some of you may feel this last point overstates the case. I honestly don't believe it does, but I see no need to press the matter.
Instead, I ask you to think about the doubt cast on Thomas's integrity by Hill's allegations, together with the doubt cast on it by his
controversial record at the EEOC, his self-serving exception for
race-based preferences, his many disingenuous statements and endorsement of opportunism in the first set of hearings, and his
shameless and inflammatory appeals to emotion in the second set of
hearings. If you do this, I think there is no escaping the conclusion
that Thomas's integrity was in such overwhelming doubt by the end
of all the hearings that you should have been prepared to reject him
on that basis alone. Proper respect for the importance of public
confidence in the Court and for the vital part played by the Justices'
integrity in shaping public confidence in the Court required no less.
Before turning to the implications of Thomas's appointment for
the Court's decisionmaking process, I probably should discuss
briefly a factor that is important in determining public confidence in
the Court and that a number of you argued was a plus in Thomas's
case: the Justices' representativeness of different groups in society.
With Justice Marshall's retirement, the Court of course lost its one
black member. It was reasonable to suppose that the failure to appoint a black to replace Marshall would leave the Court sufficiently
nondiverse as to undermine public confidence in its fairness and impartiality. After all, not only are blacks a sizable enough percentage
of the population to have some claim on a seat simply by virtue of
proportionality, but also their history is so unique and the current
experience of being black in America is so distinctive that it is highly
unlikely that their perspectives are adequately represented by
others.
Senator Specter reasoned basically along these lines in explaining his vote for Thomas in the Judiciary Committee at the end of the
first set of hearings:
I think he brings a very, very important measure of diversity to the
Court. I think it's very important that an African-American be on
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the Court now, within the chambers of those nine Justices;
that
63
they hear the views of African-Americans in this country.
The Senator's concluding remark, however, highlighted the difficulty of applying this reasoning to Clarence Thomas:
[I]n essence, I have more confidence and I pay more attention to
his roots than to his writings ....64

Very simply, the mere fact that someone is black is no guarantee
that he or she will significantly serve the type of representative function that is important to public confidence in the Court. The key is
the extent to which the individual will approach the issues that come
before the Court from a perspective that reflects points of view
widely shared among blacks. In some cases this may be very difficult
to predict. In the case of Clarence Thomas, it was not. Unless, like
Senator Specter, you were willing to try to forget the many writings
and speeches in which Thomas expressed views widely shared
among Reagan Republicans but rejected by the great majority of
blacks, you could not sensibly find that he "brings a very, very important measure of diversity to the Court." 65 (The fact that many
blacks, particularly in the South, appeared to favor Thomas's confirmation 66 doesn't suggest otherwise. As Roger Wilkins has pointed
out, typically these supporters either did not fully appreciate how
much Thomas's views diverged from their own or else they supported him in spite of his views out of an "instinctive reaction" to
67
support one of their own.)
In short, Thomas's appointment promised to be at best a very
modest plus in terms of the Justices' representativeness of different
groups in society. Whatever it may have seemed likely to contribute
in this regard to public confidence in the Court was insignificant
alongside the threat to public confidence posed by his highly questionable integrity.
3. The Court's decisionmaking process.-The fairness and efficiency of the Supreme Court's decisionmaking process, so vital a
concern because of its importance to the orderly and sound devel63
Excerpts From Remarks by Members of Senate Judiciay Panel on Thomas, N.Y.
Sept. 28, 1991, at 8.
64
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opment of nationwide law, depends on a wide range of personal
characteristics on the part of the Justices. When the time came for
you to vote on Thomas, each of you should have had serious doubts
about his adequacy in terms of most, if not almost all, of the characteristics most significant in this regard. In fact, you should have had
such serious doubts that these doubts alone should have been
enough to persuade you to vote against him.
Objectivity and openmindedness are probably mentioned more
often than any other characteristics as desirable in a Supreme Court
Justice. 68 They obviously are crucial to the quality and fullness of
the Justices' deliberations and debate. Thomas's numerous onesided, highly partisan speeches and writings gave you good reason
to expect him to be unsatisfactory in both respects. His reputation
as an idealogue was hard-earned. In the first set of hearings, he
asked you to forget the old Clarence Thomas and see instead a man
"stripped down like a runner" and now the ultimate in objectivity
and openmindedness. 69 At the time it would have been absurd for
you to do so. After the second set of hearings, it would have been
even more absurd. His proud admission that he had not even bothered to watch Anita Hill's testimony70 hardly inspired confidence
that on the Court he would strive to understand both sides of every
question and to keep his personal views from clouding his judgment. Even more telling were his inflammatory appeals to emotion.
They showed flagrant disrespect for the fair and impartial administration ofjustice-a disrespect that belied any genuine commitment
on his part to objective and openminded adjudication.
The Justices' ability to empathize with individuals whose background or circumstances are significantly different from their own
also greatly affects the richness of their deliberations and debate.
Thomas's notorious remarks about a sister who was on welfare were
reason enough for you to have serious doubts about his ability in
this regard, and I'll limit my discussion to them.
In the course of a speech in 1980 at a conference of black conservatives, Thomas said of his sister Emma Mae Martin:
She gets mad when the mailman is late with her welfare check.
That is how dependent she is. What's worse is that now her kids
feel entitled to the check, too. They have no motivation for doing
71
better or getting out of that situation.
68
69
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It is difficult to imagine anyone with any real capacity for seeing
things from other people's perspectives feeling so little compassion
for his own sister's situation and adding public humiliation to her
miseries by belittling her in a public forum. Probably even more
indicative of Thomas's lack of empathy, though, was the disparity
between his remarks and the reality of his sister's situation. She did
not come close to fitting the stereotype that Thomas described. After her husband deserted her, she worked two jobs to support herself and her young children. At times ill health forced her to stop
working and rely on welfare, but she never remained on welfare for
any substantial period of time until 1977, when an aunt who had
helped raise her suffered a stroke. The aunt asked Martin to care for
her, and to do so Martin had to stop working and go on welfare.
After the aunt's death in 1981, Martin returned to work.2
Although Thomas could not have known when he spoke in
1980 that his sister would return to work in 1981, he should have
known at the time he spoke that she was the sort of person who
would return to work at the first available opportunity. His inability
to understand even his own sister reasonably well was strong evidence of his inability to get at all outside his own perspective, one in
which self-help is the road to salvation and dependence on others is
the root of all evil. In the news conference called to announce
Thomas's nomination to the Court, President Bush called him a person of "great empathy."7 3 Compared to whom? I couldn't guess.
For the Court's decisionmaking process to operate smoothly
and effectively, the Justices need to engage one another candidly in
debate. The probability that Thomas would bring a healthy measure of candor to the Court was slim at best. Even if you don't think
Thomas was lying about his behavior toward Anita Hill, you had
overwhelming evidence of his lack of candor. His performance in
the first set of hearings-denying the obvious meaning of past statements, claiming that he had never seriously discussed Roe, etc.provided an almost endless supply.
Another basic requirement of a fair and efficient decisionmaking process is that the individual Justices analyze rigorously the issues and facts of the cases that come before them. Thomas's
publications and speeches gave you little reason to believe that he
would provide such analytical rigor and much reason to fear that he
would not. The legal analysis that they offer suggests that Thomas
72 This account of Martin's life is drawn from Tumulty, supra note 71, and Martin
Gottlieb, Ways of Older South Linger in City of Thomas's Boyhood, N.Y. TMES, Aug. 8, 1991,
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is not someone who thinks through matters deeply, with careful attention to detail and relevant distinctions. It typically is conclusory
and superficial.
A good example is Thomas's analysis of a well-known theory of
the Ninth Amendment in the chapter that he contributed to a book
on the Reagan era. (The Ninth Amendment provides: "The
enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.") 74 Referring to Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion in Griswold v.
Connecticut,7 5 the contraceptive case that paved the way for Roe,
Thomas posed the question: "Does the Ninth Amendment, as Justice Goldberg contended, give to the Supreme Court certain powers
to strike down legislation?" 76 The answer, as Thomas saw it, was
simple: "That would seem to be a blank check. The Court could
designate something to be a right and then strike down any law it
thought violated that right." 77 He then speculated that the Court
might "discover a right to welfare" and order Congress "to raise
taxes to enforce this right." 78
You don't need to be a fan of the Goldberg opinion to agree
that Thomas's critique dealt with it in an extremely superficial way.
Basically, Thomas created a straw man and knocked it down. He
entirely ignored Goldberg's attempt in the opinion 7 9 to provide criteria for deciding which unenumerated rights deserve a high level of
judicial protection. Although Thomas was happy to assume otherwise, Goldberg and the two Justices, Warren and Brennan, who
joined his opinion were hardly so naive as to overlook the dangers
of giving judges the sort of "blank check" that Thomas so readily
found. In fact, in offering his criteria, Goldberg emphasized that
"judges are not left at large to decide cases in light of their personal
and private notions. ' '8 0 Thomas's speculation that Goldberg's theory might lead to a Court-ordered tax hike to fund a right to welfare
may be the type of argument that made Thomas a favorite on the
conservative lecture circuit, but it is a sorry excuse for legal analysis. Having made no effort whatsoever to explain how the Court
could reasonably justify recognizing a right to welfare under
Goldberg's criteria-something that it is not at all obvious the Court
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could do8 l-Thomas had no basis for citing possible consequences
of recognizing such a right as an argument against Goldberg's approach. Probably most telling, though, as far as Thomas's analytical
rigor, was not the weakness of the criticisms he leveled at the
Goldberg approach. Instead, it was his apparent obliviousness to
the ease with which these criticisms could be turned around and
used against him. The amorphous natural law mode of constitutional interpretation that Thomas had been championing in his
speeches and writings8 2 offers judges about as blank a check as
you'll ever find.
It is probably not fair to expect Supreme Court nominees to
provide affirmative proof of their analytical rigor in their confirmation hearing testimony. After all, the setting is hardly one conducive
to studious reflection. But I do think nominees can fairly be expected not to provide in their testimony the sort of positive proof of
lack of analytical rigor that Thomas provided. His testimony not
only failed to dispel the doubts about his analytical rigor aroused by
his writings and speeches; it compounded them. The following exchange illustrates why:
Senator Leahy. Other sitting Justices have expressed views on
key issues such as-well, take Roe v. Wade. You know, Justice
Scalia has expressed opposition to Roe. Does that disqualify him if
it comes up? Justice Blackmun, who not only wrote the decision
but has spoken in various forums about why it was a good decision. Are either one of them disqualified from hearing abortion
cases as a result of that?
Judge Thomas. Senator, I think that each one of them has to
determine in his mind at what point do they compromise their
impartiality or it is perceived that they have compromised their
83
objectivity or their ability to sit fairly on those cases.

Now I think we can all agree that the scope of ajudge's obligation to
recuse himself or herself from hearing a case is not always a clearcut
matter.8 4 But the fact that there is a gray area here-perhaps even a
very substantial gray area-does not mean that there are no instances clearly requiring or clearly not requiring recusal. Are Justices Scalia and Blackmun arguably disqualified from hearing
81

Cf GaryJ. Simson, A Methodfor Analyzing DiscriminatoryEffects Under the Equal Pro-

tection Clause, 29 STAN. L. REV. 663, 698-99, 701-06 (1977) (discussing the Justices'

shared premise that government has no affirmative obligation to offer welfare benefits to
anyone but incurs obligations of equal treatment when it opts to offer benefits to some
people
82
83
TIMES,
84

but not others).
See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 25.

Excerpts From Senate's Hearings [of Sept. 11, 1991] on the Thomas Nomination, N.Y.
Sept. 12, 1991, at A20.
See John P. Frank, DisqualificationofJudges, 56 YALE L.J. 605 (1947); Steven Lubet,

Advice and Consent. Questions and Answers, 84 Nw. U.L. REv. 879 (1990).

642

CORNELL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 78:619

abortion cases because they have taken firm positions on the validity
of Roe? The proper answer is so obviously "no" 8 5 that Thomas's
response indicating that he would answer "yes" should have made
you wonder how deeply and carefully he analyzes any legal issue.
Aside from everything else, this was hardly the first occasion that
Thomas had ever had to give serious thought to the issue of recusal.
He had been obliged to give it serious thought from the moment he
took a seat on the court of appeals.
The work of the Supreme Court is far too demanding to be handled well by someone who does not participate in the decisionmaking process with a great deal of dedication. Thomas's responses to
various questions in the first set of hearings should have made you
very skeptical that he would show such dedication on the Court.
Some responses indicated a rather profound lack of interest in the
work of the Court. Others suggested a lax attitude toward important aspects of the decisionmaking process.
Since Thomas had spent the summer cramming for the hearings with the help of a team of lawyers sent by the White House, 6
the least that could be expected was that he would answer adequately questions that required little more than a description of
what the Court had done in the past. For the most part, he did provide adequate, even if rather uninspiring, answers to such questions.
At times, though, his answers were so amazingly inadequate that
you had to wonder how keen an interest he had in legal analysis in
general and in the work of the Court in particular.
A prime example was his answer to the question whether a fetus
is a "person" for purposes of the Constitution:
Senator, I cannot think of any cases that have held that. I would
have to go back and rethink that. I cannot think of any cases that
87
have held that.
Perhaps he should have tried to think of cases holding that a fetus is
not a person. One that comes immediately to mind is Roe v. Wade.
In defending its abortion laws in Roe, Texas relied heavily on the
argument that a fetus is a "person" under the Fourteenth Amendment; and the Court's opinion expressly rejected this argument after detailed discussion. 8 8 Thomas claimed in the hearings that he
85

See Greenhouse, supra note 41 (noting Thomas's "surprising suggestion" that

'Justices who had written opinions on abortion might not be impartial enough to decide
future abortion cases").
86 See Neil A. Lewis, A Rehearsed Thomas Is Set for Hearings,N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1991,
at A12.
87
Excerpts From Senate's Hearings [of Sept. 11, 1991] on the Thomas Nomination, N.Y.
TiMES, Sept. 12, 1991, at A20.
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Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 156-59 (1973).
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had never discussed the merits of Roe with anyone.8 9 That doesn't
seem credible, but it doesn't seem hard to believe that he never took
the trouble to read the case with any care. (Incidentally, doesn't it
seem odd that this glaring gap in his knowledge was not remedied
by the briefing books his legal coaches supplied him or by the mock
hearing sessions they had with him? Do you suppose they left Roe
out of his preparations on the thought that he didn't have to know it
well because the plan was for him to refuse to testify about it? Or do
you think they simply couldn't imagine that anyone nominated to
the Supreme Court could possibly need instruction on the basic reasoning in Roe v. Wade?)
Also remarkably inadequate was Thomas's response to a question asking him to name "a handful of the most important cases that
have been decided by the Supreme Court since you became a law
student twenty years ago": 90
Judge Thomas. Senator, to give you a running list, I would
have to go back and give it some thought. But I certainly think
that during the time that I was in law school, two of the cases that
were considered the most significant cases, or among the most
significant cases, would have been certainly Griggs, which was decided while I was in law school .... And certainly I think Roe v.
Wade....
Senator Leahy. Are there some other cases that come to mind
in the last twenty years?
Judge Thomas. There would be others, Senator. I can't off the
top of my head. As you mention them, perhaps I could accord
some weight to them. Just not off the top of my head.9 1
That's it? Two cases, neither after 1973 and one of which he claims
never to have seriously discussed? Things sure have been dull at
the Supreme Court in the past twenty years-at least from Thomas's
perspective. Thomas's answer was so outlandish that you had to
consider the possibility that it was simply strategic-a reflection of
his handlers' strategy of avoiding open-ended debate about legal issues. After all, if Thomas named a case, he risked being asked to
explain its significance; and who knows where such a discussion
might lead! But even if the answer was strategic, it was strategic
with a cost, because you certainly couldn't write off the possibility
that Thomas really meant what he said. His less than dazzling display of legal acumen throughout the first set of hearings left you no
real choice about that.
See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
90 Excerpts From the Hearings[of Sept. 13, 1991] on the Thomas Nomination, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 14, 1991, at 6.
89

91

Id.
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You undoubtedly recall the uproar when Robert Bork testified
at his confirmation hearings that he wanted to be on the Court because the experience would be an "intellectual feast."' 9 2 Granted,
that was not the ideal reason for him to give; it would have been nice
to hear that he wanted to be on the Court so he could do more to
serve society, not so he could do more for himself. But Bork's statement was hardly as outrageous as some of his opponents claimed. It
isimportant that the Justices be people who have genuine intellectual curiosity and excitement about the Court's work. By the close
of the first set of hearings, you should have had serious doubts
whether Thomas was such a person.
In the first set of hearings Thomas claimed that his praise for
the Lehrman article did not mean that he really endorsed the article's strong pro-life and pro-natural law positions because, among
other things, he might only have skimmed the article before the
93
speech in which he mentioned it.
In other words, even if it
sounded like an endorsement, it couldn't have been one because
Thomas really didn't know what he was praising. Thomas offered a
similar excuse when he tried to persuade you not to make much of
his having served on the White House working group that turned
out a report that in one section sharply criticizes Roe. According to
94
Thomas, he signed the 50-page report but never read it.
In short,
since he didn't know what he was signing, surely he shouldn't be
held to what it said. I don't find either of these excuses particularly
credible, but that's not why I mention them to you now. Instead, I
would like you to consider how troubling these excuses are in and of
themselves. Thomas offered them to you as if they described perfectly neutral behavior. But the behavior they described was hardly
neutral. If he indeed publicly praised an article without knowing its
contents or blindly signed onto a report, he acted irresponsibly.
The fact that he seemed to regard such behavior as acceptable was
good cause for concern that he might readily lapse into similar behavior on the Court. How conscientious would he be about matters
such as whether the cases and articles cited in his opinions stand for
what he claims they do or about whether an opinion that he joins
fairly reflects his views? Coupled with the evidence of his lack of
analytical rigor and a record at the EEOC casting doubt on his sense
of responsibility to duty, these two excuses left little room for
optimism.
92 Nomination of Robert H. Bork to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
States: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on theJudiciay, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 854 (1987).
93 See Lewis, supra note 26, at A21 (reporting Thomas's testimony of Sept. 11,
1991).
94 See SENATE JUDICIARY COMM., supra note 34, at 24 (quoting Thomas's testimony
of Sept. 10, 1991).
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Finally, it is important to consider what Thomas promised to
bring to the Court in terms of collegial abilities. Did he appear
likely to engage in discussion and debate in a way that would tend to
move his colleagues toward consensus or away from it? Despite his
generally affable demeanor throughout the first set of hearings 9 5
and Senator Danforth's rather surprising claim in introducing him at
the start of the hearings that he has "the loudest laugh I have ever
heard," 9 6 the evidence was actually quite one-sided that Thomas
would add further friction to a Court already9 7 too fractious for its
own good. In his public statements and writings, he often was not
content simply to attack other people's views but gratuitously attacked them personally as well. A classic in this regard was his complaint to a Washington Post interviewer in 1984 that, rather than try to
work with the Reagan Administration to solve social and economic
problems, black leaders have done little more than go to the press
to "bitch, bitch, bitch, moan and moan, whine and whine." 9 8 By far
the most probative evidence, though, that Thomas would be a divisive force on the Court was his performance in the second set of
hearings. Justice Harlan was once eulogized for his ability as a
member of the Court to "disagree without being disagreeable." 99
After witnessing Thomas's shameless and inflammatory appeals to
emotion and hearing him recount self-righteously that he had not
even bothered to listen to Anita Hill's testimony, you could have felt
confident that, if Thomas was confirmed, no one would ever pay
him a similar compliment. In fact, after the second set of hearings,
you had to wonder whether Thomas was someone who could even
be expected to agree without being disagreeable.
POWER POLITICS

After Thomas was confirmed, I couldn't help thinking that, if
only some things had been done differently, the vote would have
gone the other way. If only the Committee had questioned Thomas
more aggressively. If only the Committee Chairman had not announced early in the second set of hearings that Thomas deserved
95 See Richard L. Berke, Sense of Humor Helps Thomas in His Trial by Committee, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 14, 1991, at 6.
96 Senator Danforth's Remarks on Behalfof Court Nominee, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1991, at
A23.
97 See Linda Greenhouse, Name-Callingin the Supreme Court: When theJustices Vent Their
Spleen, Is There a Social Cost?, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 1989, at BI0; Brenda Jones Quick,
Whatever Happened to Respectful Dissent?, 77 A.B.A. J., June 1991, at 62.
98 SeeJuan Williams, EEOC ChairmanBlasts Black Leaders, WASH. POST, Oct. 25, 1984,
at A7 (quoting Thomas).
99 Earl Warren, Mr. Justice Harlan, As Seen by a Colleague, 85 HARV. L. REV. 369, 370

(1971).
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the benefit of the doubt.'0 0 If only the Committee had called expert
witnesses on sexual harassment. And so on.
Maybe I was right, but the bottom line is that the outcome
never should have turned on matters of this sort. As I hope I've
demonstrated to your satisfaction, on the merits this was an openand-shut case. Although I would like to think that I've done a pretty
nice job of pulling together for you the available evidence about
Thomas, I don't think any of the weaknesses I've identified should
come as any great surprise. To be blunt, each of you who voted for
Thomas either tried not to see his shortcomings or didn't allow
yourself to take them very seriously, or both.
I know that's not a very neutral thing to say. I say it less,
though, as anaccusation than as a statement of fact. Those of you
who voted for Thomas were remiss in your duties, but you were not
entirely to blame. Much of the blame belongs to George Bush. I
believe that many of you-perhaps almost all of you-voted for
Thomas largely because you felt that the President had left you no
choice. He had made his strong support of Thomas absolutely clear
to the public, 10 ' and you knew that it is usually costly at the polls to
go against the wishes of a popular President,10 2 which is what Bush
very much was at the time.' 0 3 Also, the President obviously was not
bashful about letting individual Senators know that he dearly
wanted this nomination to go through and that he was prepared to
make full use of the various means 10 4 of personal persuasion at his
disposal to ensure that he got what he wanted.' 0 5 No one who had
witnessed Arlen Specter's performance in the Bork confirmation
process could fail to appreciate how persuasive this President could
be. During the second set of Thomas hearings, it was difficult to
believe that the Specter of the Bork hearings and the one now
before us were one and the same. Gone was the independentminded Republican Senator who had questioned Bork rigorously
but fairly and who ultimately, by breaking ranks with a Republican
President and opposing the nominee, helped trigger Bork's de100 See R.W. AppleJr., Confirmation Battle, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1991, at A21 (noting
Senator Biden's remarks).
101
See, e.g., Andrew Rosenthal, Bush Emphasizes He Backs Thomas in Public Meeting, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 10, 1991, at Al.
102
See GEORGE C. EDWARDS III, PRESIDENTIAL INFLUENCE IN CONGRESS ch. 4 (1980);
RICHARD E. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE MODERN PRESIDENTS ch. 5 (rev. ed.
1990).
103
See Adam Clymer, Most Americans Are Undecidedon CourtNomination, Poll Finds, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 10, 1991, at Al, A16.
104 See EDWARDS, supra note 102; BARBARA KELLERMAN, THE POLITICAL PRESIDENCY
(1984);

NEUSTADT,

supra note 102.

105 See, e.g., Rosenthal, supra note 101; Andrew Rosenthal, Thomas's Edge Steady, Vote
Due Today, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1991, at Al.
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feat. 106 In his place was the ultimate company man, a Senator who
seemed intent only on proving his partisan loyalties. As I watched
him resort to one after another dubious tactic in an effort to cast
doubt on Anita Hill's credibility,10 7 1 couldn't help but wonder what
the Arlen Specter of the Bork hearings would have said.
Although it may be tempting to try to write off Thomas's confirmation as a sort of aberration-perhaps in a class by itself because
race was involved so much more prominently than usual-the history of Supreme Court appointments in the twentieth century
strongly suggests that it would be foolish to do so. This modem
history is one of unprecedented presidential domination of the appointment process. Since 1900, the Senate has rejected Supreme
Court nominations at a rate of only one out of ten;10 8 prior to 1900,
the rejection rate was much higher-approximately one out of
four.' 0 9 (In keeping with standard practice, 110 I count as "rejections" not only nominations voted down by the Senate but also ones
withdrawn by the President or not acted on by the Senate.) The
ease with which Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Souter were confirmed in recent years underlines how close the President's power of
nomination has come to being a power of appointment. All three
arrived at their confirmation hearings having publicly said and written little-in Souter's case, almost nothing" '-that shed light on
their views on the major constitutional issues of the day; all three
left their hearings having added relatively little illumination in this
regard; 12 and you overwhelmingly approved all three for seats on
the Court, even giving Scalia and Kennedy unanimous votes. It may
not have been obvious from the modern history of Supreme Court
appointments that the President could push a nominee as weak as
Thomas through a Senate that had a 57-43 Democratic majority,
but a close vote was probably the least that should have been expected. Thomas's confirmation simply showed how far an obvious
trend had gone. (No, I haven't forgotten about your rejection of
See ETHAN BRONNER, BATTLE FOR JUSTICE 265-73, 311 (1989).
107 See Anthony Lewis, Time of the Assassins, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1991, at A19; Rosenthal, supra note 53.
108 See Simson, supra note 1, at 323 n.139 (and add the two subsequent, successful
nominations).
109 See id. at 324 n.143.
110
See JOSEPH P. HARRIS, THE ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE 302-03 (1953);
Robert B. McKay, Selection of United States Supreme CourtJustices, 9 U. KAN. L. REV. 109, 130
(1960).
111
See Steven A. Holmes, A Window to Souter's Way of Life, N.Y. TiMES, Aug. 15, 1990,
at A25; Claudia MacLachlan, A Product of His Conservative Community, NAT'L LJ., Aug. 6,
1990, at 45.
112 See Linda Greenhouse, Senate PanelApproves Judge Kennedy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28,
1988, at A10; Greenhouse, supra note 41 (commenting on the Scalia and Souter
hearings).
106
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Bork. But that was nothing more than the exception that proves the
rule. So many factors eased the way for you to vote "no" on BorkBork's lengthy and highly controversial "paper trail," 113 Reagan's
waning popularity, 14 lame duck status, and less than overwhelming
show of support for the nominee, 11 5 Bork's not-ready-for-primetime beard, etc.-that his rejection can scarcely be seen as any sort
of declaration of independence on your part. It's also worth remembering that, although the nomination was defeated, 42 of youhardly an insubstantial number and only eight short of the number
needed for the nomination to succeed-supported the President's
choice. If a couple of influential borderline "no" votes had been
"yes" instead, Judge Bork might well have become Justice Bork.)
Thomas's appointment illustrates three major difficulties of an
appointment process as dominated by the President as ours is today.
Most obviously, there is not enough protection against appointments not in the nation's best interests. Too much turns on the
President's dedication to the common good. Whether the President
in selecting a nominee gives priority to the nation's best interests or
to personal or partisan advantage, the nominee is almost certain to
be confirmed. The current presidential domination of the appointment process also is very troubling because it threatens the Court's
independence. The President has so much leeway to place on the
Court people to the President's ideological liking that the line separating the executive and judicial branches can become perilously
blurred. Finally, this presidential domination enhances the possibility that the Court will exercise its judicial review authority in a manner dangerously at odds with the will of the majority. The process
by which the Justices are appointed is probably the principal source
of protection against this possibility. However, the protection provided by the process is significantly less if appointments depend
only on the President's ideological preferences than if they depend
on some sort of compromise between the President's preferences
and the Senate's.
If these difficulties do not persuade you that the current distribution of authority in the appointment process is unsound, I should
emphasize that they are more than policy objections. They have
constitutional significance as well. As I argued at some length in the
113 See Nomination of Robert H. Bork to Be Associate Justice of the United States Supreme
Court: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on theJudiciary, 100th Cong. Ist Sess. 6180-6285
(1987) (SenateJudiciary Committee report on the nomination); Ronald M. Dworkin, The
Bork Nomination, 9 CARDOZO L. REV. 101 (1987); Stephen Gillers, The Compelling Case
Against Robert H. Bork, 9 CARDOZO L. REV. 33 (1987).
114 See BRONNER, supra note 106, at 101; Clymer, supra note 103, at A16.
115 See BRONNER, supra note 106, at 200, 264, 309-12.
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article discussed at the beginning of this letter, 1 16 these difficulties
together with the language of the Constitution's Appointments
Clause and the history of the clause's adoption strongly indicate that
the Senate was intended to play a very substantial checking role in
the appointment process. The Senate, no less than the President,
was intended to make an informed and unencumbered judgment as
to whether a particular appointment would be in the nation's best
interests. I won't repeat here the various arguments that I made in
the article to establish the constitutional basis for a forceful and independent Senate role. I hope, though, that any of you not yet convinced of the importance of changing the current allocation of
authority in the appointment process will turn to the article for
them.
Over the years some people have questioned the wisdom and
legitimacy of a forceful and independent Senate role in the appointment process by claiming that your adopting such a role would have
certain adverse effects. Probably the charges heard most often are
that it would lead to prolonged vacancies, lower quality appointments, and an unduly political conception of the Court. My short
answer to these charges is that none of them is well-founded. My
17 If
much longer answer is set out in the article I've been touting.1
any of you are hesitant because of these charges to adopt an enhanced role, I urge you to turn to the article for this discussion as
well.
PROPOSED REFORMS

The following suggestions for reform have a common objective:
to reestablish an appointment process in which the President's and
the Senate's judgments about the desirability of a particular appointment to the Supreme Court have roughly equal weight. Some
of these suggestions are rather dramatic, but so is the existing imbalance of power in the appointment process. If you have reservations about them, I hope you will at least recognize the need for
strong measures and come forward with some of your own.
1. Proportion of votes necessary for confirmation.-If a Supreme
Court nominee were required to win the approval of two-thirds of
the Senate rather than simply half, the Senate's voice in the process
of appointing the Justices would be considerably greater than it is
now. Except in the unlikely event that the President's party has substantially more than half the seats in the Senate, the President would
be obliged in selecting a nominee to reach out to a fair number of
116
117

Simson, supra note 1, at 306-15.
Id. at 315-23.
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Senators other than those 1 8 whose membership in the President's
party makes them exceptionally vulnerable to presidential persuasion. (If any proof was needed of this special vulnerability, the 41-2
Republican vote on Thomas surely supplied it.) A two-thirds requirement would also fit in nicely with the way in which your terms
are staggered. As you well know, all other things being equal, a
Senator who does not face reelection for four or five years is in a
much better position to resist presidential pressures than one who
must run again in a year or two. (Is there any doubt that the fact
that he would face reelection in 1992 had much to do with Senator
Specter's radically different behavior in the Bork hearings in 1987
and the Thomas hearings in 1991?) 119 If a nomination were to meet
with stiff resistance from the one-third of the Senate whose fourplus years before facing reelection gives them a certain immunity
from presidential pressures, it would have a great deal of difficulty
getting the two-thirds majority needed for confirmation.
Although a change to a two-thirds majority requirement can be
defended as a means of bringing the distribution of power in the
appointment process more into line with original constitutional intent, I doubt that it could be accomplished without a constitutional
amendment. The constitutional text does not explicitly say that a
simple majority is all that is required, but it rather obviously says so
by implication. 120 Is an amendment of this sort a realistic possibility? Thanks to the Thomas appointment, I think it is. As I have
argued, the appointment provided a vivid demonstration of the
nightmarish results to which presidential domination of the appointment process can lead. In addition, I think many people were simply appalled to realize that, under the existing system, a nominee
could be confirmed to a lifetime seat on the nation's highest court
even though half of the Senate might regard the nominee as unfit
for nonideological reasons, such as lack of personal integrity or
dedication.
The fact that the Constitution calls for more than a simple legislative majority for very few purposes doesn't seem to provide
grounds for serious objection. The two-thirds Senate majority
needed to approve a treaty' 2 ' and the two-thirds majorities of both
Houses needed to override a presidential veto 12 2 and propose an
118

See

GEORGE C. EDWARDS

III,

AT THE MARGINS:

PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP OF

CONGRESS chs. 3 & 5 (1989).
119 See Gwen Ifill, After Judging Thomas, Senators Face the Public: A Split Decision on Specter's Role, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 1991, at A14.
120 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
121 Id.
122
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cis. 2, 3.
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amendment for state ratification 23 obviously reflect the judgment
that decisions to do these things have such-important implications
that the legislature should not decide to do them unless it has a special measure of conviction that they are right. In light of the national significance of the issues decided by the Justices, the final and
nationwide effect of their decisions, and the Constitution's virtual
guarantee to them of life tenure, 124 a decision to confirm a Supreme
Court nominee is sufficiently important in its implications to be
paired with those decisions for which a two-thirds majority is already
required.
Although it is realistic to expect that an amendment requiring a
two-thirds majority may be adopted, it is also realistic to recognize
that the amendment process is so difficult that such an amendment
may well fail or at least not be adopted for some time. It is no accident that since the adoption of the Bill of Rights in 1791, the Article
V requirement of two-thirds majorities in both Houses and ratification by three-fourths of the states has been met only 17 times. 125
The history of the ultimately unsuccessful Equal Rights Amendment
illustrates how formidable the Article V requirements may be even
126
for a proposal with widespread and vocal support.
With the difficulties of amending the Constitution in mind, I
suggest that, at least until an amendment requiring a two-thirds majority is adopted, you adopt a rule that the Senate cannot act on a
Supreme Court nomination unless two-thirds of the Senate Judiciary Committee has voted to approve the nominee. I don't see anything in the Constitution's simple-majority requirement for Senate
confirmation that prevents you from adopting such a rule of selfrestraint. Although I like the rule less than an amendment because
the SenateJudiciary Committee vote may not be very representative
of the general Senate reaction to a nominee, I think it would be a
step in the right direction as far as correcting the imbalance of
power in the appointment process.
2. Benefit of the doubt.-During the second set of Thomas hearings and the subsequent floor debate, a number of you stated that
Thomas deserved the "benefit of the doubt" as to whether Anita
Hill's allegations were true. 12 7 To some extent these statements
123

U.S. CONST. art. V.

124 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 ("The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts,
shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour .... ").
125 See 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. F5 (reporting certification of the 27th amendment on May
18, 1992, and providing its text).
126
See JANE J. MANSBRIDGE, WHY WE LOST THE ERA (1986); DEBORAH L. RHODE,
JUSTICE AND GENDER ch. 4 (1989).
127 See, e.g., Apple, supra note 66 (quoting various Senators); Andrew Rosenthal,

Thomas's Edge Steady, Vote Due Today, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1991, at Al (same).
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may have been prompted by the hearings' superficial resemblance
to criminal proceedings. t 28 (Yes, superficial resemblance. Despite
Thomas's cries of a lynching, he wasn't on trial for his life or liberty
or even to see whether he would have to pay damages to Anita Hill.
Like any Supreme Court nominee, he was simply being examined to
decide whether he deserved the rare privilege of sitting on the nation's highest court.) But many of you have expressly or implicitly
applied the notion that a nominee deserves the benefit of the doubt
to matters of a very different sort. Some have applied it, often quite
expressly, to the ultimate question of whether the nominee should
be confirmed. 12 9 Less obviously but no less importantly, numerous
of you have applied it-almost always without acknowledging doing
so-to a nominee's views on issues of constitutional law: if the record is ambiguous or silent as to where a nominee stands on a constitutional issue, you assume that the issue can't be a basis for
opposing the nominee and move on to the next. This benefit-ofthe-doubt mentality in assessing a nominee's views on constitutional
issues was apparent at times in the first set of Thomas hearings, such
as when various of you expressed frustration with Thomas's refusal
to comment on certain issues or with his efforts to cloud the record
on others. 130 It was even more clearly on display, though, during
the Souter hearings. Aside from some grumbling to the press about
being asked to confirm a "stealth" candidate, many of you acted as if
the dearth of information about Souter's substantive constitutional
views essentially made those views a nonissue in the confirmation
3
decision. ' '
128
See, e.g., 137 CONG. REc. S14626 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1991) (remarks of Sen.
Dixon) ("I think we have to fall back on our legal system and its presumption of innocence for those accused.... Under our system, the person being accused gets the benefit of the doubt."); id. at S14653 (remarks of Sen. Murkowski) ("Under our system of
justice the benefit of the doubt must belong to the accused."); id at S 14660 (remarks of
Sen. Kassebaum) ("[Judge Thomas] will either advance to our Nation's highest court
under a cloud of suspicion he can never fully escape. Or, he will return to the circuit
court with the equivalent of a guilty verdict stamped on his resume.").
129
See, e.g., 137 CONG. REC. S14297 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1991) (remarks of Sen. Fowler)
("I have tried to insist on every judicial nomination of every President, that I would give
both the President and his nominee the benefit of the doubt."); Clifford Krauss, On Eve
of Vote for Thomas, a Senator GrapplesforAnswers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1991, at A18 ("[Senator Shelby] said if it weren't for the sexual harassment charges, there is no doubt how
he would vote.... [He had] concluded that 'maybe he was inexperienced, but he had a
good education. I was going to give him the benefit of the doubt.' ").
130 See Neil A. Lewis, FrustratedThomas Panel Ends Hearings with Talk of Overhaul, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 21, 1991, at 7; Neil A. Lewis, High Court Nominee's Testimony Continues to
FrustrateDemocrats, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1991, at Al.
131 See Richard L. Berke, Senate Committee Endorses Souter, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1990,
at Al; Linda Greenhouse, The 'Not Bork' Test, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 1990, at A18; Tim
Smart, Souter's Opponents Still Don't Have Him in Their Sights, Bus. WK., Sept. 17, 1990, at
34.
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The idea that the benefit of the doubt goes to the nominee has
no place in confirmation proceedings. It should be abandoned by
those of you who hold it, because it gives disproportionate weight to
the President's judgment about the nominee. Each time you give
the nominee the benefit of the doubt on a matter on which his or
her record is ambiguous or silent you are deferring to the President's tacit judgment that the nominee is acceptable in that regard.
You are not exercising your own considered judgment on the matter, which is something you obviously need to do if the appointment
process is to reflect in fairly equal measure the President's judgment
and your own.
Depending on the particular matter in question, if a nominee's
record is ambiguous or silent, it may make perfect sense not to disregard the ambiguity or silence but to count it against the nominee.
Rather than giving the nominee the benefit of the doubt, you should
be asking yourselves (1) how much doubt exists about a particular
matter and (2) how acceptable is it that this amount of doubt exists
for this particular matter. For example, public confidence in the
Court is so important a value and so dependent on the public perception that the Justices are individuals of the highest personal integrity that even a moderate amount of doubt about a nominee's
personal integrity probably should be counted heavily against him
or her. On the other hand, the existence of substantial doubt
whether a nominee would vote to uphold a particular Supreme
Court precedent almost certainly deserves little or no weight if the
precedent is one of rather limited national importance.
3. Scope of questioning of nominees.-The first set of Thomas
hearings illustrated how asking nominees about their views on issues that the Court is likely to decide during their years on the
Court can make it difficult for you to vote in accordance with your
best judgment of the nominee. When you questioned Thomas in
this way, you gave him a golden opportunity to pressure you to ignore or give little weight to the very significant indications in his
prior speeches and writings as to his likely votes on the Court. By
claiming openmindedness and denying that his speeches and writings discussing certain issues were as indicative of his future voting
patterns as they seemed, Thomas put you in a serious predicament.
He essentially forced you to call him a liar or publicly treat him like
one if you wished to base your prediction of his likely votes primarily on the most reliable evidence of those votes-his speeches and
writings. Particularly with a nominee put forward by a popular President, this clearly was a politically unpalatable thing for you to do,
and many of you obviously resisted doing it or did it with great
reluctance.
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You don't have to believe that nominees are generally as lacking in integrity as Thomas to recognize the wisdom of not questioning any of them about their views on issues that they would be likely
to face on the Court. I certainly don't hold nominees in general in
such low esteem, but I do believe that they are human. Even nominees of far greater integrity than Thomas are a serious threat to answer such questions in a way that compromises your ability to arrive
at an informed and independent judgment. A seat on the Supreme
Court can be a powerful incentive for nominees to be intentionally
less than completely candid when the truth might lessen their
chances for confirmation. In addition, even the most scrupulous
nominees may not be able to resist believing that they are more
openminded about an issue than they really are when professing
openmindedness would ease their path to confirmation.
If questioning nominees about their views on issues apt to come
before the Court had substantial benefits, I might not be so ready to
propose abolishing the practice. But I frankly can't see that it has.
In general, such questioning produces unreliable evidence of likely
votes when the questions relate to issues that the nominee previously has discussed in a speech or publication, and it produces remarkably uninformative evidence of likely votes when the questions
relate to issues that the nominee previously has not publicly discussed. When questioned about issues of the latter sort, nominees
often refuse to respond on the ground that doing so might prejudice or appear to prejudice their ability to decide cases raising such
issues if they are confirmed. 132 On the other hand, if they do respond, they typically do no more than either explain why the issues
raised are important or complex or announce their commitment to
certain broad principles that virtually no one would contest. 133 If,
as I proposed earlier, you change your thinking about benefit of the
doubt, it is quite possible that nominees generally may become
more forthcoming in their answers when asked about issues that
they have not discussed in their speeches and writings. If so, rather
than generally uninformative answers, you can expect to get ones of
the same dubious reliability as you now get when you ask nominees
about issues that they previously have publicly discussed.
If you stop questioning nominees about their views on issues
likely to come before them on the Court and also go along with my
proposal about benefit of the doubt, Presidents may decide that it is
best to forgo stealth candidates in favor of candidates who have a
132
See William G. Ross, The Questioningof Supreme Court Nominees at Senate Confirmation
Hearings: Proposalsfor Accommodating the Needs of the Senate and Ameliorating the Fears of the
Nominees, 62 TUL. L. REV. 109, 125-39, 152-56 (1987).
133 See id. at 157-62, 168-71.
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substantial "paper trail." Although, as Justice Souter seems intent
on proving, 3 4 some stealth candidates may turn out to be splendid
additions to the Court, I would regard such a development as an
unqualified good. There is a lot to be said for having a reasonably
good idea of what you are getting, and you can make a reasonable
prediction as to how candidates with substantial paper trails are
generally apt to vote. I would be concerned about biasing the process in favor of candidates with substantial paper trails if having a
substantial paper trail meant having such well-formed positions on
many issues that one's mind is basically closed. Bork notwithstanding, there is no necessary correlation between the two. There are
many people who speak out on the issues in a way that suggests that
their minds are hardly dosed to reasonable persuasion. On the
other hand, as exemplified by Justice Scalia,13 5 the fact that a candidate has a rather modest paper trail is no assurance at all that he or
she does not, have rather fixed views. Silence is not necessarily
golden.
One cost of no longer questioning nominees about their views
on issues likely to come before them on the Court may appear to be
the loss of a valuable source of insight into such personal characteristics as analytical rigor and dedication. Thanks, though, to the extensive coaching that has become a staple of the appointment
process (and that, after the defeat of the one recent nominee (Bork)

who rejected it, almost certainly will remain

SO),136

this sort of ques-

tioning yields much less insight into these personal characteristics
than might be expected. The fact that Thomas's lack of analytical
rigor and dedication shone through brightly in the first set of hearings despite a summer's worth of coaching simply attests to his extraordinary weakness as a candidate-weakness that should have
been more than apparent to you even before you began asking him
any questions.
If at this point you are still not persuaded to stop questioning
nominees about their views on matters apt to come before them on
the Court, I perhaps should remind you that I am not asking you to
do anything unprecedented. What I am asking you to do conforms
to Senate practice until 1955.137 Until 1925 the Senate not only refrained from asking nominees questions of this sort; it did not even
134
See Linda Greenhouse, Souter: Unlikely Anchor at Court's Center, N.Y. TIMES, July 3,
1992, at Al.
135
See generally Symposium, The JurisprudenceofJustice Antonin Scalia, 12 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1583 (1991).
136 See Lewis, supra note 86; Neil A. Lewis, As Hearings on Thomas Approach, Attention
Focuses on Foes' Strategy, N.Y. TiMES, July 29, 1991, at A12.
137
See Paul A. Freund, Appointment ofJustices: Some HistoricalPerspectives, 101 HARv. L.
REV. 1146, 1157-63 (1988); Ross, supra note 132, at 116-23.
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ask them to appear at the hearings. For the next thirty years nominees appeared sporadically but were not asked their views on issues
that they might decide on the Court.
Finally, let me ask you to keep in mind a consideration discussed earlier in this letter: public confidence in the Court. If, in
response to your questions, nominees suggest or appear to suggest
that they will vote certain ways and then vote differently within a few
years of confirmation, public confidence in the Court can't help but
be undermined. Consider, for example, the harmful effect of
Thomas's concurrence this past June in a dissenting opinion by justice Scalia that, among other things, trashed the Court's "Lemon
test"13 8 for Establishment Clause issues.1 3 9 Less than a year earlier,
Thomas had stated in his confirmation hearings that he had "no
personal disagreement" with the Lemon test.1 40 Even responses
claiming openmindedness can be problematic in terms of public
confidence in the Court. Take, for example, Thomas's claim in the
hearings that he had an open mind about Roe v. Wade.14 1 (In case
you don't recall, although Thomas repeatedly refused to comment
with any specificity on the reasoning in Roe, he did assure you that
he had not made up his mind as to Roe's validity.) By making this
claim of openmindedness in the face of evidence that he was a sure
bet to vote to overrule Roe and then voting within a year to overrule
Roe, 142 Thomas debased in the public eye not only himself but also
the Court on which he sits.
4. Questioning by professionals.-Foryou to cast an informed and
independent vote on a nominee, it is important that the hearings
reveal as clearly and fully as possible information relevant to
whether the nominee should be confirmed. Not only do you obviously need for yourselves the information that hearings can supply;
you also need for the public to have it so that if you vote in accordance with your best judgment of the nominee, you can have some
confidence that your decision will be respected and understood. I
138

See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971); GaryJ. Simson, The Estab-

lishment Clausein the Supreme Court: Rethinking the Court'sApproach, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 905
(1987).
139 Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2685 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by
Rehnquist, CJ., and White and Thomas, JJ.).
140
See SENATE JUDICIARY COMM., supra note 34, at 154 (quoting Thomas's testimony
of Sept. 11, 1991); see also Neil A. Lewis, High Court Nominee's Testimony Continues to Frustrate Democrats, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1991, at Al, A19 (reporting Thomas's testimony of
Sept. 12, 1991, that he accepted the Lemon test).
141
See SENATE JUDICIARY COMM., supra note 34, at 25, 59 (quoting Thomas's testimony of Sept. 11, 1991); Neil A. Lewis, Thomas Declines Requests by PanelforAbortion View,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1991, at Al, A23 (reporting Thomas's testimony of Sept. 10,
1991).
142 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S.Ct. 2791 (1992).
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know it won't endear me to many of you-particularly not those of
you on the Senate Judiciary Committee-to say this, but experience
shows that as long as Senators are the ones who will be asking the
questions, the hearings are not going to be as informative as you
need them to be.
On the whole, Senators are not well-suited in three respects to
do the questioning in confirmation hearings. First, although all of
you have a general understanding of constitutional law issues and
the work of the Supreme Court, few of you have the sort of in-depth
understanding of these matters needed to explore thoroughly
through questioning the available evidence of a nominee's likely
votes on the Court. The problem is not that those of you on the
Committee never ask any good questions bearing on a nominee's
likely votes. With the assistance of your staffs, you come into the
hearing room with quite a few. Rather, the problem is that you
often fail to ask follow-up questions that do a good job of probing a
response's ambiguities and implications.1 43 If you adopt my proposal not to question a nominee about his or her views on issues apt to
come before the Court, this problem will become somewhat less serious, because the witness who would be expected to be by far the
most evasive in responding to questions bearing on the nominee's
likely votes will not be answering such questions at all. It would still
be very helpful, though, to have questioners with greater expertise
in constitutional law and the ways of the Court than almost any of
you can offer. Without legally sophisticated questioning to guide
them, even witnesses who are not trying to be evasive can't be
counted on to communicate clearly to you and the public as much as
they could about the nominee's likely voting patterns on the Court.
And let's be honest with one another here. After the various dizzying discussions of natural law in the first set of Thomas hearings, 14 4
how many of you not on the Committee can really contemplate with
equanimity the prospect of your colleagues questioning anyone
about complex issues of constitutional law?
A second respect in which Senators are generally not wellsuited to conduct the questioning in confirmation hearings is that
your cross-examination skills tend to be rather limited. 4 5 The
problem mentioned above of weak follow-up questions reflects not
143

See, e.g.,John P. MacKenzie, The Trouble with Hearings, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1991,

at A30; What Verdict forJudge Souter?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 1990, at A30 (editorial).
144
See, e.g., Excerpts From Senate's Hearings[of Sept. 11, 1991]on the Thomas Nomination,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 1991, at A20; Excerpts From Senate's Hearings[ofSept. 10, 1991]on the
Thomas Nomination, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1991, at A22.
145 See, e.g., F. Lee Bailey, The Thomas Hearings: Where Was the Crucible? The CrossExamination That Wasn't, 78 A.B.A.J.,Jan. 1992, at 46; Anthony Lewis, Lessons of Thomas,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1991, at A17.
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only a lack of particular legal expertise but this deficiency as well.
With rare exception, you have not had the training generally needed
for effective cross-examination or have not had sufficient opportunity to practice cross-examination to keep your skills sharp. As illustrated by the Thomas hearings, the absence of highly skilled crossexamination makes confirmation hearings less illuminating than
they need to be in various regards. Not only are the nominee's
likely voting patterns not exposed as clearly as they might be, but
the same may be said for crucial personal characteristics such as the
nominee's integrity and dedication.
The third and perhaps most significant respect in which Senators typically leave much to be desired as questioners in confirmation hearings is captured by a reporter's comment after the second
set of Thomas hearings: "In their questions to the nominee, the
Democrats tiptoed around him as if he were an undetonated
mine." 146 Granted that those hearings were unusually politically
sensitive-Thomas certainly did his best to ensure that-I still think
they demonstrate that you are too vulnerable to political inhibitions
to be counted on to ask the tough questions whenever they are
needed.
The solution? Obviously I feel you should step aside and let
other people do the questioning. I feel less strongly as to exactly
who these people should be. I am inclined to think that highly
respected lawyers with government experience but not currently in
government are the most promising group of candidates, but I don't
rule out other possibilities such as the Senate Judiciary Committee
staff. The key is whether the individuals selected are strong in the
respects in which I suggest you generally come up short. You may
even want to give some thought to using different questioners at
different times in the hearings if the hearings are the sort that call
for detailed questioning in two or more rather specialized areas.
Constitutional law and sexual harassment are two such areas that
come to mind.
5. Expert witnesses.-If no one called to testify at the hearings
can speak with authority on an important matter in issue, even the
best questioning in the world may be of very limited value in helping
you cast an informed and independent vote on the nominee. The
second set of Thomas hearings illustrates my point. Experts on sexual harassment-in particular, experts on its psychological aspectscould have testified authoritatively on the credibility of Anita Hill's

146

Walter Goodman, Clear Picture of White Power and Black Achievement, N.Y. TIMES,

Oct. 17, 1991, at A22.
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account.147 By deciding not to call such experts as witnesses,1 48 the
Committee invited each of you as well as each member of the public
to judge the credibility of her account by whatever psychological
theory seemed most agreeable, however discredited or simply
downright lunatic the theory might be by professional standards.
I can't understand how the Committee could have allowed this
to happen (or, I should say, how the Democrats on the Committee
could have allowed this to happen. The Republicans on the Committee were obviously only too happy to keep the door open to wild
theorizing). 4 9 It's not as if no one on the Committee recognized
the need for expert testimony. In questioning Hill, Senator Heflin
more than once showed an awareness of this need. Rather remarkably, though, he seemed to proceed on the view that Hill was capable
of filling it:
Senator Heflin. Well, the issue of fantasy has arisen. You have
a degree in psychology from University of Oklahoma State
University?
Professor Hill. Yes.
Senator Heflin. Have you studied in your psychology studies
when you were in school and what you may have followed up with
the question of fantasies? Have you ever studied that from a psychology basis?
ProfessorHill. To some extent, yes.
SenatorHeflin. What are the traits of fantasy that you study as
you remember?
Professor Hill. As I remember ....
ProfessorHill...
I think that he wanted to see me vulnerable,
and that if I were vulnerable that he could extract from me
whatever he wanted, whether it was sexual or otherwise. That I
would be under his control.
Senator Heflin. Now as a psychology major, what elements of
human nature seem to go into that type of a situation?
ProfessorHill. Well, I can't say exactly. I can say .... 150
Even if prior to the above exchanges the other members of the
Committee were confident that they could do without experts, I
can't believe that some of them didn't have the urge to rush out to
get some afterward.
See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
See Maureen Dowd, Republicans Gain in Battle by Getting Nasty Quickly, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 15, 1991, at Al, A18.
149
See Rosenthal, supra note 53.
150
Excerpts From Senate's Hearings[of Oct. 11, 1991] on the Thomas Nomination, N.Y.
TiMES, Oct. 12, 1991, at 14.
147
148
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I haven't tried in any systematic way to go through the transcripts of past confirmation hearings to see how often expert testimony was needed and secured. Obviously, experts on
constitutional law have testified with frequency in recent years, 5 1
and I was somewhat heartened to find that the leading expert on
judicial ethics was asked to testify in the Haynsworth hearings about
the nominee's controversial failure while an appellate judge to recuse himself from a particular case.15 2 On the other hand, I suspect
that, as in the Thomas hearings, the Committee has been slower to
recognize the need for nonlegal expertise than for legal expertise.
In any event, whether the expert testimony needed is legal or nonlegal, I hope that the Committee will be more alert in the future to the
need for it than it was during the hearings on the Hill allegations.
6. Hearings on the appointment process.-My final proposal, holding hearings on the appointment process, does not call for change
in any particular aspect of the appointment process. Instead, it attempts to make it easier for you to adopt particular changes by increasing public awareness of the need for change. The hearings that
I envision would examine not only particular proposals for change
but also, more broadly, the practical importance of enhancing the
Senate's role in the appointment process and the constitutional basis for doing so. Granted, such hearings would be unlikely to top
the Nielsen ratings of the second set of Thomas hearings. But
thanks to the recent controversies over Bork and Thomas, I think
that, as long as such hearings are held in the near future, a substantial portion of the public would follow them closely enough on television or through the newspapers for them to serve an important
educational function.
On the final day of the first set of Thomas hearings, Committee
Chairman Biden called attention to many Senators' expressions of
dissatisfaction and frustration with the hearings and promised to
hold hearings to consider ways of improving the appointment process. 153 A year later such hearings are yet to be held. Any sense of
urgency apparently has dissipated. The need, though, has not.
Hearings of the sort promised are long overdue.
151

See, e.g., Nomination of Robert H. Bork to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the

United States: HearingsBefore the Senate Comm. on theJudiciary, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. viii-xix
(1987) (listing the witnesses at the Bork hearings, including numerous constitutional law
scholars); Neil A. Lewis, Thomas Is Unsuitable, 4 Academics Say, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1991,
at A16.
152 See Nomination of Clement F. Haynsworth, Jr., of South Carolina, to Be AssociateJusticeof
the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st
Cong., Ist Sess. 110-36 (1969) (testimony ofJohn P. Frank).
153 See Lewis, Frustrated Thomas Panel Ends Hearings with Talk of Overhaul, supra note
130.
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7. A proposal not proposed.-Since Thomas's confirmation,
enough people have proposed that the process be changed to require the President to consult with the Senate before making nominations1 54 that I probably should explain why I don't propose this
change as well. I think I can do so most clearly by examining the
ways in which these people would alter the process to mandate consultation. They all seem to want you to commit yourselves to voting
on principle against confirmation if you haven't been properly consulted about the nominee.' 5 5 In addition, most but not all prescribe
a particular form that such consultation should take-for example,
the Senate must receive from the President a list of possible nominees and may strike off the names of nominees whom it finds unacceptable,' 56 or the Senate presents the President with a list of
57
possible nominees from which the President must choose.'
Proposals that don't call for a particular form of consultation
(but instead call for "genuine" consultation or the like)' 58 seem to
me too likely to produce only token gestures of consultation to warrant serious discussion. On the other hand, proposals that do call
for a particular form of consultation seem to me quite certain to
have a substantial impact on the process, and I have serious reservations about the impact that they are apt to have. Basically, they ask
the Senate to do things that it does not seem well-suited to do. I
believe that the Senate is very capable of arriving at an independent
and reasoned decision as to whether a nominee's appointment
would be in the nation's best interests. Such a decision draws heavily on one of the Senate's greatest strengths: the ability to engage in
wide-ranging deliberation and debate. By the same token, I seriously question whether the Senate is well-suited to compile a list of
possible nominees from which the President must choose or to
strike names off of a list compiled by the President, because these
activities draw most heavily on abilities that are not among the Senate's strengths. Consider, in particular, the Senate's rather limited
154 See, e.g., Michael J. Gerhardt, DividedJustice: A Commentary on the Nomination and
ConfirmationofJustice Thomas, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 969, 992 (1992); David A. Strauss &
Cass R. Sunstein, The Senate, the Constitution, and the Confirmation Process, 101 YALE L.
1491, 1514, 1518 (1992); Christopher H. Schroeder, Low Roads to the High Court: Executive Extremism, N.Y. TiMEs, Oct. 23, 1991, at A23.
155 For a slight variation on this theme, see 138 CONG. REc. S8863-64 (daily ed.June
25, 1992) (remarks of Sen. Biden) (stating that, if a nomination is not preceded by "genuine consultation between the White House and the Senate," he will oppose the nominee "immediately" upon nomination, unless the choice of nominee reflects an effort by
the President to compromise ideologically with the Senate).
156 See, e.g., Strauss & Sunstein, supra note 154, at 1514.
157
See, e.g., Gerhardt, supra note 154, at 992.
158

155.

See, e.g., Schroeder, supra note 154. See also the Biden approach noted supra note
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abilities to investigate informally but efficiently and to act promptly
and decisively in choosing among a range of alternatives. (Even if
the Senate delegates to a committee the job of compiling the list of
possible nominees or narrowing the President's list, I doubt that the
job is apt to be done very well; and delegation would raise the question of whether it is being done in a way that fairly represents the
thinking of the entire Senate.)
Some who argue that the President should have to consult with
the Senate before making nominations cite in support of their position the mention in the Appointments Clause of the Senate's "advice."159 In fact, though, the language of the clause is so
incompatible with their position that a good argument can be made
that proposals mandating that the President consult with the Senate
on nominations can't be adopted without a constitutional amendment. This language strongly suggests that the framers regarded
the Senate as best suited to provide substantial input into the process only after the nomination has been made. According to Article
II, Section 2, the President "shall nominate, and by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint ... Judges of the
supreme Court."1 60 If the framers intended to require the President to seek the Senate's advice before deciding upon a nominee,
they did an awful job of saying it. On its face, the clause requires the
President to seek the Senate's advice only after deciding upon a
nominee. What value could the Senate's advice have for the President at that point? Most obviously, such advice-whether formal, in
the form of Senate hearings or floor debate, or informal-could persuade the President to withdraw a nomination before the Senate
votes on it. In addition, this advice conceivably might persuade the
President not to appoint a confirmed nominee. As you may recall
from Marbury v. Madison 161 (though this was obviously one of its less
majestic points), the Senate's vote to confirm does not have the effect of appointing a nominee; the President must still sign the nominee's commission. No President has ever been sufficiently
impressed by Senators' advice critical of a nominee to refuse to sign
a confirmed nominee's commission. But you shouldn't have to
strain to think of an instance in which such critical advice, coupled
with a very narrow margin of victory in the Senate, gave a President
more than enough reason to refuse to sign.

159
160
161

See, e.g., Strauss & Sunstein, supra note 154, at 1512, 1514.
U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, c. 2.
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 155 (1803).
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SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS AND THE NATION'S BEST INTERESTS

As you've probably noticed, the nation's best interests play a
big part in my thinking about the Thomas appointment and the appointment process in general. Although it may not be sensible to
expect you and the President to decide everything with the nation's
best interests foremost in mind, I believe it is entirely appropriate to
expect you and the President to make decisions about Supreme
Court appointments in this way. Decisions of this sort implicate important national interests more significantly than most decisions
that you and the President make. In addition, thanks to the Constitution's virtual guarantee of life tenure to successful nominees,
these decisions have a finality that your decisions and the President's typically do not. While legislation can be amended or repealed if it proves ill-advised, Supreme Court appointees, however
deeply flawed, are basically with us to stay.
In closing, then, I appeal to your sense of duty to do all you can
to ensure that the nation's best interests are far better served in the
appointment process than they were served by the appointment of
Clarence Thomas. In case, though, you need any additional incentive, let me also appeal to your sense of survival. Supreme Court
nominations receive so much publicity and public attention today
that, simply from the perspective of trying to ensure your longevity
in office, it pays to worry about whether particular appointments
and the process in general serve the nation's best interests well. As
some Thomas supporters among you already have learned or will
learn the hard way,' 6 2 even though Supreme Court appointees unsuited for their high office may be virtually immune from removal,
the elected officeholders who put them there definitely are not.
Sincerely yours,
Gary J. Simson
Professor of Law

162 See, e.g., Isabel Wilkerson, Illinois SenatorIs Defeated by County Politician,N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 18, 1992, at A19 ("Ms. Braun was drafted into the race in the divisive aftermath of

the hearings on the Supreme Court nomination ofJudge Clarence Thomas in the fall.
Mr. Dixon voted in favor ofJudge Thomas's nomination to the Supreme Court, anger-

ing many women who vowed to get even at the polls.").

